

## RAF and SOF Integration

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The United States defense community is facing an extremely challenging security environment based on factors both foreign and domestic. The country must find effective, yet efficient methods for best safeguarding national interests. To this end, the U.S. Army has begun development and implementation of the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept, while U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has done the same with its Global Special Operations Network (GSN) model. This paper will examine these initiatives and propose several recommendations for both the Army and USSOCOM that could quickly and significantly improve the cumulative, synergistic value of these efforts. In the current and projected security environment, it is essential to maximize the effectiveness of the RAF and GSN concepts.

### **The Global Security Environment**

“The decline of the state and political order is only inevitable (and has historically been observed) after the breakdown of any preceding empire and any kind of preceding world order, as happened recently following the breakdown of the former USSR and the end of the Cold War.”<sup>1</sup> The bi-polar world that existed after World War II effectively maintained relative peace through enforcement and balance by the two great super powers. Bi-polarity, however, is no longer the global security paradigm and consequently, the influence of tribal, ethnic, business, religious, and criminal entities has risen resulting in more chaotic and less stable security conditions.<sup>2</sup> Increasing instability is anticipated to continue, as many of the sovereign national borders in Africa and the Middle East, established during a colonial period are being contested along tribal or ethnic divisions.<sup>3</sup> The effects of globalization significantly complicate and contribute to this destabilization of the security environment.

Globalization is the process that has exponentially increased the rate and frequency by which goods, services and information move around the world.<sup>4</sup> Prosperity has significantly increased in many places with detrimental consequences in others. Conflict and tension have increased as various cultures and values collide. Nations that previously would have had minimal mutual contact are now directly connected. People feel dissatisfied and sometimes threatened as their exposure to other ways of life and standards of living increases, yet remains outside their control.<sup>5</sup>

Additionally, globalization has interconnected the world in such a way that an event or decision on one side of the globe can significantly impact another part of the world. Globalization has little regard for the traditional notion of borders or entry points; globalization is simply too pervasive for any nation-state to fully resist. Another exacerbating factor of globalization is the speed with which the world moves. Effects and changes now occur at a staggering rate. These conditions can become security issues as state and non-state actors begin to identify and employ globalization as an instrument to achieve their own interests. Globalization will continue to affect trends and patterns worldwide and generate increasing security challenges.

The increasing complexity of the security environment is compounded by dire economic conditions. Financially, the U.S. is not as strong as it once was. While there is evidence of growth in the economy, the

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growing amount of national debt poses a genuine security threat with no tangible plan for bringing it under control for at least a decade.<sup>6</sup> The fiscal situation is driving the DoD along with other executive departments, to make deep, substantive budget cuts. The U.S. cannot afford its current security expenditures. The directed level of cuts is forcing our military to reexamine its strategy for safeguarding the nation while simultaneously recovering from two major wars.

The U.S. is emerging from more than a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, two conflicts that placed significant demands on the military's ground forces in terms of both operational tempo and mission complexity. At best, both of these operations will be viewed as marginally successful and at worst, as having contributed directly and significantly to the decay in U.S. power due to over expenditure of national resources. Regardless, the effect on the U.S. public has generated an attitude of war weariness. The nation seeks a less adventurous foreign policy, with a decreasing use of military forces and a renewed focus on economic conditions at home.<sup>7</sup> While this idea is appealing, the U.S. will struggle to maintain its national interests around the globe if it retrenches, particularly as the established world order faces tremendous threats.

National security experts recognize that the nation must pursue the smart application of its military capabilities in coordination with the other instruments of national power. Recently at an Aspen Institute forum, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy remarked:

When America comes out of a period of war, we are tempted to turn inward as isolationist impulses assert themselves. When I look at the world, I see problems for which it's difficult to imagine solutions without an international response.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of the U.S. population seeking retrenchment and more isolationist foreign policy, the United States Government (USG) has recognized the need to remain engaged around the world in order to protect the nation and its interests. Acknowledging the interconnectedness of the global community of state and non-state actors makes it unrealistic for any country to isolate itself from the world without experiencing significant risks to its own well-being. This interconnectedness is particularly true for the U.S. as a global super-power with economic interests in all regions of the world. While public opinion may force political decisions to reduce the scope and scale of foreign military operations, the nation's armed forces will remain essential to shaping and preventing conflict, as well as furthering U.S. interests overseas. The continued need for strong, engaged armed forces remains clear based on guidance from the nation's senior leaders.

Security Cooperation is defined in Joint doctrine as:

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.<sup>9</sup>

This is an integral mission for the military. That security cooperation is tasked to combatant commanders (CCDR) from the highest level of the USG is recognition that recurring and continual engagement with other military forces around the world is vital to our nation's security.

Engaging with foreign military elements has been essential to military operations over the last two decades. This conclusion was advanced in a study by the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff (JS) J-7, charged with evaluating the last decade of war. The purpose of the study was to inform the joint force development cycle about how to build a more responsive, versatile and affordable military. This study summarized 11 strategic themes after examining a wide range of operations including:

conventional warfare, counter insurgency, humanitarian assistance, defense support to civil authorities and counter-terrorism (CT).<sup>10</sup>

One of the key themes identified was coalition operations and the significant benefits that the country gains through such activities. The JCOA made several key recommendations on how to ensure the military is appropriately postured and prepared to execute future operations. An essential finding was that the military needed to increase engagement and training with key potential partners in order to build relationships and opportunities for influence. The JCOA report highlighted specifically theater security cooperation (TSC) activities as a viable way to achieve such partnerships.<sup>11</sup> The need to build military-to-military relationships was a common finding across several JCOA themes, including host nation partnering, building partner capacity, understanding the environment, which incorporated leveraging forward presence, as well as the significance of improving language capabilities and cultural proficiency.<sup>12</sup>

Senior defense officials have recognized how critical cultural understanding is to military operations. Most recently, the CJCS directed the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Hands Program. Growing out of the identified success of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Asia-Pacific Hands Program will develop “regionally attuned command-line officers” through deliberate educational opportunities, assignments and regional experiences.<sup>13</sup> Currently, aside from foreign area officers and linguists, only special operations forces (SOF) under USSOCOM possesses apt cultural expertise and language capabilities. The need for such capabilities is reflected in efforts to expand that command in scope and authorities.

### **USSOCOM’s Global SOF Network (GSN)**

USSOCOM is currently the global SOF provider and also responsible for synchronizing the planning for global CT operations in the functional combatant commander role. Additionally, as the DoD designated lead for security force assistance, USSOCOM has a synchronizing responsibility for the planning of global training and assistance efforts. To accomplish these responsibilities, the command is comprised of a 4-star headquarters located in Tampa, along with service components in various continental U.S. locations. Of note, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs), previously assigned to the GCCs, were recently assigned to USSOCOM, which now assumes responsibility to organize, train and equip these elements. While USSOCOM will assume combatant command (COCOM) for the TSOCs, they will remain under the operational control (OPCON) of the designated GCCs as the SOF component command for each region. More significant, however, are the increased authorities provided to USSOCOM; shouldering the responsibility for deploying and, when directed, employing SOF globally with the approval of the GCCs.<sup>14</sup> These changes reflect recognition by national security leaders that the future global security environment will be chaotic and complex. In response, USSOCOM is attempting to develop more anticipatory and preventive mechanisms for managing security issues as described in the command’s Global Special Operations Forces Campaign Plan (GCP-SOF).

The GCP-SOF’s mission reads:

USSOCOM provides trained, equipped, ready, and regionally aligned SOF in support of GCCs, and leverages the whole of government, allies, and partners, to conduct sustained special operations as part of a broader strategy to eliminate threats to U.S. interests and protect the American people.<sup>15</sup>

Four Lines of Effort are detailed: 1) Persistent Focused Alignment, 2) TSOC Command and Control Capability, 3) Whole of Government unity of effort, and 4) International Cooperation Framework. By these efforts,

USSOCOM seeks to address persistent instability with persistent engagement through developing a Global SOF Network (GSN).<sup>16</sup>

GSN is a key component of SOF being more responsive, more flexible and better prepared for a wider range of missions. The network consists of: USSOCOM headquarters and its service components, the regional TSOCs, interagency and allied partnerships that include the International SOF Coordination Center (ISCC) and Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCCs). The plan also increases USSOCOM's presence within the National Capital Region (NCR) in order to deepen the connectivity to the USG interagency through establishing a USSOCOM-NCR organization.<sup>17</sup>

The ISCC and RSCCs would be new organizations within the command. The ISCC is a cell located at Tampa comprised of senior SOF representatives from allied and partnered nations. The concept is to facilitate cooperation among international SOF organizations to more effectively prevent security issues and/or respond more rapidly and appropriately once a challenge has emerged. While the ISCC will have no C2 authority or responsibility, it will provide a venue for close coordination among various allied SOF. Of special significance will be ISCC use of a classified information technology network that allows for rapid information sharing among members at the appropriate classification level. The capability for two-way secure communication among the diverse nations' SOF will greatly facilitate collaboration. USSOCOM intends to have U.S. interagency participation within the ISCC from the various organizations of the USG that have security-related expertise and assets. If approved, this structure will move the country closer to a whole-of-government approach for managing security issues.<sup>18</sup>

The RSCCs are also envisioned to be a part of this GSN designed to "provide geographic combatant commanders and chiefs of mission with an unprecedented unity of effort and an enhanced ability to respond to regional contingencies and threats to stability." The RSCC will mirror the ISCC located in Tampa, but with a particular regional focus of efforts and membership. The concept seeks to ensure regional issues do not grow into larger theater problems that would demand larger expenditures of national resources.<sup>19</sup> In addition to these organizations, USSOCOM is requesting other infrastructure growth as part of the GCP-SOF.

In light of USSOCOM receiving COCOM of the TSOCs, the command is proposing significant growth in size, capabilities, and functions for the TSOCs. The GCP-SOF conceives of the TSOCs as the operational hub for SOF efforts within the GCCs. The initial capabilities document identifies three capability gaps that currently exist within each of the regional TSOCs. Specifically, the ICD maintains that the TSOCs must be able to function as the core of a joint task force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ), execute distributed C2, and manage information across different organizations. Each of these capabilities will require growth in manpower, facilities and communication architecture.<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, these required enhancements come at a time of constricting budgetary conditions for the DoD.

This fiscal reality is reflected in guidance from the Vice CJCS in response to the proposed GSN concept, which reads:

Per CJCS PLANORD dated 19 April 2013, the GSN must fully reflect likely resource constraints and maximize the use of existing infrastructure. At a minimum, it must be cost-neutral and offer scalable options under reduced costs and force structure.<sup>21</sup>

More significant is the initial response from the legislative branch. Congressional analysis has expressed real concern with USSOCOM being able to achieve such bold expansion even under "normal" budgetary conditions, let alone in an increasingly restrictive budgetary environment. Specific areas mentioned by the Congressional Research Service were the growth of USSOCOM-NCR, the TSOCs, and the RSCCs. Additionally, since USSOCOM receives manpower from the services, the proposed growth in personnel to

achieve the GSN will be challenging as all the military Services are expected to drawdown. The Army, being the largest contributor to USSOCOM, will take the most significant reductions in funding and has already announced a 25 percent reduction in Army 2-star HQs and above.<sup>22</sup> However, like USSOCOM, the Army is also attempting to reorganize itself to meet challenges associated with global security environment.

### **U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)**

The Army recognizes the current and future security environment as one of persistent instability and conflict.

The strategic and operational environments are driving the United States and its allies and friends, toward an emphasis on shaping missions in unstable regions in addition to preparing for existential threats. We anticipate an expanding range of smaller, shorter, rapidly changing missions.<sup>23</sup>

As the bulk of land-component forces of the joint force, the Army is attempting to equip, train and organize its forces to better meet CCDRs' requirements. A central component is the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, the purpose of which is to increase the quality and quantity of Army capabilities provided to the combatant commanders. The latest definition for RAF from a Department of the Army Fragmentary Order dated October 17, 2013 states:

Regionally Aligned Forces provide the Combatant Commander with up to joint task force capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to enable him to shape the environment. They are those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities Service retained, CCMD aligned and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Includes Army total force organizations and capabilities which are: forward stationed; operating in a combatant command area of responsibility; supporting from outside the area of responsibility, including reach-back; and prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. Regional missions are driven by combatant command requirements. This requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.<sup>24</sup>

RAF is a new model for training, deploying and employing Army forces in support of CCDRs requirements. As such, the Army is developing new processes and methods for execution. Currently, all Army elements within the operational force will fall into one of three categories: 1) *assigned*; forces that are given to the CCDRs by the SECDEF to fulfill their missions and responsibilities as directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 2) *allocated* forces provided by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with SECDEF priorities to meet validated CCMD requirements, and 3) *service retained, CCMD aligned*; Army units that remain under Army service control but are aligned to CCDRs.<sup>25</sup> This final term is newly developed and not reflected in the UCP. The verbiage replaces the term "distributed" but still provides CCDRs with no directive authority over forces earmarked as aligned. The verbiage does, however, authorize a direct liaison from the RAF unit to the CCMD through the GCC's Army Service Component Command (ASCC). This connectivity assures that the RAF unit understands the requirements of its anticipated or directed missions within the AOR.<sup>26</sup>

The Army foresees many benefits for the CCMDs and the joint force through the implementation of the RAF concept. These aligned units will be more regionally attuned and better prepared to meet the requirements of a theater commander. The alignment of Army elements up to and including a corps will give the CCDR another JTF-capable HQs that is focused on the region, along with the requisite established relations.

Two other benefits that the Army envisions are providing a cost effective option for achieving theatre campaign plan objectives and having responsive planning support for the CCMD as needed.<sup>27</sup> While the Army anticipates many benefits, managing and executing such a new concept comes with many challenges. Consequently, the institutional Army is adjusting to meet this new requirement.

The Army, through Forces Command (FORSCOM), uses the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in order to ensure it provides appropriately trained, equipped and manned forces at the required time to achieve directed missions. This process had to be tightly managed during the last twelve years of war as brigade combat teams (BCTs) were in extremely high demand, a wide array of new equipment and capabilities were being fielded, and requirements in theater changed regularly. During this wartime period, the Army used a three-year cycle to take a unit through resetting, preparation and then deployment. With the RAF concept, ARFORGEN is being adjusted to a two-year cycle for Active Component forces comprising one-year of *Reset, Train/Ready* and one-year of *Available*. Reserve Component forces will execute a five-year ARFORGEN cycle.<sup>28</sup>

The intent of the ARFORGEN cycle is to bring BCTs to the highest level of readiness (C-1) as well as provide them initial region specific training during the first year. The second year, *Available*, will contain more robust regional training tailored to specific requirements, as well as that period during which the BCT is prepared to deploy elements in support of a CDRs TSC activities, bilateral / multilateral military exercises, or for operational missions.<sup>29</sup> A BCT will depend on external support to train for the regional nuances and culture of their aligned AOR.

The 2/1 Armor brigade combat team (ABCT) was the first Army unit to execute the RAF concept. Their baseline, foundational training was to achieve mission essential task list proficiency for decisive action culminating in a successful rotation to the National Training Center. Additionally, however, the brigade worked on developing their culture, regional expertise and language (CREL) capability. This required the brigade to tap into several different organizations outside their formation. Such organizations included the 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade (Ft. Polk, LA), the Naval Post-Graduate School, Kansas State University, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute.<sup>30</sup> The unit established a robust and formalized training methodology for instructing Soldiers in CREL that they called 'Dagger University.' This 'university' exposed leaders and Soldiers to recurring sessions familiarizing them with history, culture, religion, geography, economy, governance, security capacity/threats, tribal factors, engagements, media operations, negotiations and the use of interpreters. The brigade was able to successfully develop relationships with various subject matter experts from a range of organizations who could best prepare the deploying Soldiers for the RAF mission.<sup>31</sup> These may not be lasting relationships for this brigade however.

The Army currently rotates the alignment of BCTs which means the next time 2/1 ABCT is a regionally aligned brigade then it may be directed towards a completely different AOR. Additionally, divisions and their habitually assigned BCTs are not regionally aligned to the same region. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division began preparing for the RAF mission in the fall of 2013. The division itself will be aligned to U.S. Central Command in the Middle East. The 1<sup>st</sup> BCT will be the RAF in the European Command AOR, while the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade will align to the U.S. Pacific Command.<sup>32</sup> This construct will generate inefficiencies in home-station training as well as preclude unity of effort.

## Recommendations

Both the Army and USSOCOM are attempting to implement change in order to better provide for national security while the DoD is experiencing tremendous budgetary pressures. Recommendations for improving both the RAF and GSN concepts include areas where greater synergy is needed. A DOTMLPF-P

analysis can assist in framing the recommendations. DOTMLPF-P, an acronym used to denote a method for evaluating potential changes in the joint force, stands for: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

*Doctrine* refers to the fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.<sup>33</sup> TRADOC serves as the Army's doctrinal hub although each basic branch maintains a 'center of excellence' that facilitates the development and proliferation of their specific war-fighting principles. Additionally, USSOCOM has the J-7/9 Directorate of Training, Doctrine and Capability Development that serves in this capacity for its mission. Three changes in doctrine will improve the overall effectiveness of the military's GSN and RAF initiatives.

Addressing conventional force (CF) and special operations interoperability is the first needed doctrine change. Military interoperability has improved significantly over the last decade, but unless the lessons learned are incorporated into doctrine, they could well be lost. Coordination measures, task organization structures and C2 constructs must be included. Additionally, each element must address deployment and employment tactics, techniques, and procedures within the other's doctrine. Increasing awareness of the points of interdependence between CF and SOF elements for success in the complex security and budgetary environment is imperative. Improving interoperability will significantly improve the implementation of the GSN and RAF models.

The second recommendation under *doctrine* is to institutionalize the concept of the human domain. The ability to understand peoples, culture, tribal affiliations, customs, religion, and sources of power, is essential to effective military operations. We have learned that over the last two decades. The recent Army effort to establish a 7<sup>th</sup> Warfighting function, *Engagement*, with Army SOF as its proponent, is critical to enhancing sensitivity to the significance of influence in the human domain. The idea of engagement is a needed addition in doctrine as it addresses an essential aspect of modern war fighting. Formalizing the construct within doctrine will undergird the human domain and assist both RAF and SOF operations in support of GCCs.

A final area that needs to be addressed in *doctrine* is capturing both the RAF and GSN concepts within service doctrines. While both are emerging models, the Army and USSOCOM need to ensure that best practices, roles, missions and methods are captured. It is essential to institutionalize these concepts accurately throughout the Army, SOF and joint force in order to achieve greater collaborative effects.

The military defines *organization* as a unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support joint warfighting capabilities.<sup>34</sup> Three aspects of organization are addressed: 1) culture, 2) assigning of forces, and 3) directed duties and responsibilities for CCDR subordinate commands. USSOCOM and the Army must change their cultures if the RAF and GSN concepts are to achieve optimal effectiveness.

The Army must recognize it stands at a transition that represents a tremendous opportunity for the service. The significant external factors that are forcing changes provide a rare period when the institution can make substantive and lasting adjustments in its culture to achieve a more capable Army. In the current culture, the Active Component (AC) BCT is viewed as the standard of measure for the service. Unfortunately, this downplays the bulk of Army capabilities. The Army needs to recognize that the most critical functions are outside the BCT to include cyber, missile defense, logistics and mission command; these capabilities are essential to the joint fight. This recognition can be advanced in the RAF concept by highlighting capabilities the Army can provide from outside the BCT. The Reserve Component (RC) is also a large part of this restructured vision.

The Army must continue efforts to change the Service's cultural perspective on the AC-RC dynamic. Far too much parochialism exists with the net effect of preventing a sound force mix, readiness timelines, and equipping that is needed given the current fiscal environment. Such bias is amply reflected in the public



bickering among senior Army and Army National Guard officials.<sup>35</sup> Organizing the total Army, encompassing the totality of the AC/RC, to best meet the nation's security requirements for both state governors and the joint force is imperative. This effort will require evaluating when a capability is needed in the progression to major combat operations to assure the right capability is in the right component, accurately arrayed for appropriate regional missions. Such adjustments will require deliberate effort to change the total Army culture, not only by senior leaders within each component, but also by their subordinate constituencies.

The Army must protect and promote the wartime culture of independent action by subordinates. Junior leaders have to be trained, encouraged and expected to effectively operate in the absence of supervision. This requirement for mission command will be critical for the successful implementation of RAF as a method for managing Army forces. The epitome of mission command, junior leaders must be selected for RAF missions based on their ability to operate independently. These leaders must think creatively and solve problems, all within the legal, moral and ethical norms of our nation and service, and do so without supervision. A culture of de-centralized execution must be fostered, trained and demanded from CF leadership.

Independent action of this type is already expected in the special operations community. SOF personnel are specially selected, trained and equipped to operate as part of a small element in remote, often hostile, environments. Unfortunately, a portion of the current GSN effort is trending away from this core aspect of SOF culture. USSOCOM is seeking to build more HQs and increase the ability to execute C2 from a distance. The SOF culture has moved towards a more professional, centrally managed and technologically dependent "service-like" institution. SOF's publicly recognized successes and corresponding growth since 9/11, has

brought Special Operations to a level similar to the rest of DoD wherein the most important priority among the hierarchy is the growth of the bureaucracy. This largely unconscious effect is to be expected; any large organization experiences it quite naturally.<sup>36</sup>

USSOCOM needs to resist the temptation towards institutional entrenchment and retain the culture's *raison d'être*: small teams executing sensitive operations with little guidance and no supervision.

The most significant organizational change the Army needs to make in the RAF concept is to *assign* forces to the CCDRs rather than just aligning them. Aside from the institutional Army and the Global Response Force, all Army elements need to be assigned to a CCDR. This should be done after analysis by HQDA in conjunction with CCDRs on the appropriate capabilities (e.g., armor, infantry), force mix (e.g. AC, RC) and capacity to include a theater response force package. This evaluation should also include Army force requirements for the functional combatant commands. Assigning operational Army forces to CCDRs would negate FORSCOM's primary function as a force provider. The rest of FORSCOM's responsibilities could be assumed by HQDA, TRADOC, and the CCDRs. Reallocating these missions might allow the Army to draw down FORSCOM entirely. However, the potential exists for additional HQs reductions across the assignment of enabling elements, as well. CCDRs would assume training and readiness oversight (TRO) across the force just as European Command and Pacific Command currently exercise over their assigned forces. Additionally, HQDA and the JS would need to establish mechanisms for assuring a baseline capacity of readiness across Army capabilities within the GCCs. This analysis would mitigate the risk of assigning all Army forces to CCDRs.

The benefits of assigning forces would help to make the Army better postured, more responsive and more capable of supporting the CCDRs. While transfer authority across CCMDs would remain with the SECDEF, CCDRs could utilize their assigned forces in their own AORs under existing COCOM authorities. Currently, aligning forces does not establish any command relationship between the RAF element and the CCDR; he simply does not have the authority to direct training, deployment, and exercises. Additionally,

through assigning forces, units would cultivate deeper relationships and cultural awareness while enhancing the CCDR's capability and a more forward focused Army.

Assigning forces to CCDRs is something that USSOCOM needs to pursue as well. While most SOF elements have been regionally oriented for years, significant benefits, as noted previously, are gained by assigning SOF forces directly to the GCCs. Benefits include cost and manpower savings through closing the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). Similar to FORSCOM, this layer of command would no longer be required. Further efficiencies would be gained as other SOF capabilities were assigned to GCCs, specifically civil affairs and military information support operations units. Additionally, having both SOF and CF assigned to the same CCDR would strengthen their operational relationships. It is imperative that the Army and USSOCOM encourage such interoperability as the DoD pursues greater efficiencies in providing for national security.

Two other organizational changes that will improve SOF/CF interdependence involve a better division of labor between theater elements. The first gains efficiencies for GSN and RAF. Rather than USSOCOM growing the TSOCs' capability to C2 and sustain SOF operations over the expanse of their AOR, the Army and USSOCOM should formalize the ASCC's responsibilities in this regard. The Army, along with the other services, has the directed requirement to provide support to SOF operations, as well as maintaining JTF capable HQs. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the benefits of 'mixed' command structures, i.e., CF elements working for SOF and vice versa. The benefit would eliminate the need to build and sustain two 'JTF-capable' HQs, both the ASCC and the TSOC.

Re-alignment of responsibilities would also capitalize on existing infrastructure and personnel, as well as protecting SOF trained operators from having to supplement TSOC staffs. Such a change would require minimal expansion of the ASCCs by establishing them as three-star or four-star JTF-ready commands. Army billets could be gained through closing down the three Army corps HQs. This would move the Army's most talented three stars forward into the GCCs. The corps' responsibilities could be divided among the divisions, TRADOC and the ASCCs in order to maximize Army capabilities under the CCDRs. Any risk associated with closing three Army corps would be mitigated by the enhanced ASCCs capabilities.

The second division of labor will create more effective implementation of RAF and GSN. The TSOCs should be designated as the supported command for planning, organizing, and coordinating all TSC activities. This directive would include a TSOC assuming OPCON of the Army's RAF elements and directing the training, validation, and management of deployments for security cooperation. Such a change would allow the TSOC to evaluate the right force for the right mission across the AOR, having the flexibility to place SOF into more sensitive areas, yet gaining economy of force through employment of CFs where appropriate. The norm would be a mixed team of SOF/CF tailored for the TSC activity or operational missions. In order for such an integrated team to be both cohesive and effective, they will need to train together during pre-deployment.

*Training* is the instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks.<sup>37</sup> SOF/CF integration has become a near routine event during the last ten plus years of war and proven to be extremely effective. USSOCOM states:

Lessons learned from Afghanistan indicated that prior to a combat rotation, units should train and integrate early to foster relationships, instill the "one team, one fight" mentality, understand each other's staff planning procedures and defuse any misconceptions or friction points. CF integration with SOF is a proven strategy and is critical to accomplishing GCC goals.<sup>38</sup>

With resources becoming increasingly constrained, it will take concerted effort by the Army and USSOCOM to capitalize on potential SOF/CF training opportunities. This can be facilitated by assigning co-

located units to the same CCDR, i.e., 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (SFG) and the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY assigned or aligned to Central Command.

*Training* efficiencies can also be gained by capitalizing on the resident capabilities within each formation. CF personnel will generally need instruction on regional cultures, interagency/country team familiarization and language training. Expertise for these areas resides within the SOF community. CF units bring considerable capacity for planning, staff operations, and the execution of conventional operations. Overall effectiveness can be achieved by SOF and CF through deliberate, habitual, and fully cooperative joint training.

*Materiel* refers to all necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support joint military activities (without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes).<sup>39</sup> While common within SOF, communications equipment for use by small RAF teams in more remote environments has yet to be authorized by the Army. Satellite communications and systems that ride a commercial network will be required. Enhanced communication capabilities will be required to facilitate coordination, support, and assistance for CF elements. Ensuring communication systems are interoperable with SOF in the specified region is essential.

To further increase the interdependency between CF and SOF, USSOCOM should implement tighter restrictions on its use of Major Force Program (MFP) 11 funds. MFP-11 is the funding mechanism that USSOCOM has developed to acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies and services. Congress has expressed concern with the possibility that use of MFP-11 funds will expand beyond its intended purpose. Legislators are exercising greater scrutiny over these dollars to prevent waste and/or inefficiencies.<sup>40</sup> Fortunately, the more USSOCOM is reliant upon the military services, the more interdependence is achieved between SOF and CF. USSOCOM, to the greatest extent possible, should capitalize on any equipment or service that can be acquired through any military department. While increasing interoperability is important for material solutions, it is particularly salient for the professional military education (PME) system.

*Leadership and education* is the product of a learning continuum consisting of training, experience, education, and self-improvement.<sup>41</sup> Senior military leaders view continuing education of a professional Soldier as critical and each military service offers appropriate training programs and educational venues. All service departments and USSOCOM can gain efficiencies. In order to improve interdependence and gain efficiencies, the Army and USSOCOM need to pursue combined educational opportunities and eliminate duplicative educational venues. With the growth of SOF unique education tracks, the services have fewer contacts between SOF and CF personnel, effectively reducing relationships and diminishing interdependence. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the commander of USSOCOM must reverse this trend. A change will enhance working relationships and improve GSN and RAF collaboration.

Improving CF Soldiers' knowledge and understanding of SOF will also improve the effectiveness of both RAF and the GSN. The Army must increase PME that impacts SOF. Programs of instruction must address the interdependence and incorporation of SOF in combat operations. Changes are needed at every educational level from pre-commissioning through the strategic level, including at the Sergeants Major Academy. Indeed, a SOF familiarity certification might be an appropriate addition to existing Army education programs. Implementing familiarity certifications would enforce the importance of understanding SOF throughout the Army. More importantly, doing so will provide a deeper pool of CF service members who are properly trained to function with USSOCOM, a TSOC, or some other special operations task force.

Army leaders will require more extensive and deeper exposure to regional and cultural studies. Greater PME exposure will improve the effectiveness of the RAF model by preparing leaders who are better attuned to the human domain. For select noncommissioned officers (NCO) and officers, appropriate language training must be incorporated into their professional education courses. Extant military educational systems must adjust if they are to better prepare professional military personnel for regionally oriented service.

Within the DOTMLPF-P construct, *personnel* connotes the development of manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies necessary to man, support and sustain the Army.<sup>42</sup> Personnel policies for the Army must be adjusted not to simply encourage but to require regional specialization. While some military specialties would not be regionally aligned, the majority of service members would concentrate on a specific AOR. Such a change is consistent with the CJCS's recent Asia-Pacific Hands Program and would incorporate a career specialization with a specific AOR. Area specialists beyond those found in SOF and serving as foreign area officers (FAO) are needed to better meet CCDRs requirements if the RAF concept is to become both viable and effective.

Given that 45 percent of joint SOF are Army personnel, the Army drawdown will impact USSOCOM.<sup>43</sup> The command must identify which positions require personnel with deep SOF training, experience and education and which billets can be manned with talented Army CF service members. An evaluation of SOF-unique billets is particularly necessary across the TSOCs given the anticipated growth needed to fulfill the GSN concept. Despite force reductions, however, the Army must be prepared to assign talented, command-track CF personnel the TSOCs. Doing so will require implementing directive personnel policy changes.

Both USSOCOM and the Army must promote the cross pollination of CF and SOF personnel into different formations. Tours must be career enhancing, professionally rewarding, and should include serving as planners and liaison officers within appropriate operational HQs. Adjusting assignment policies will pay dividends by strengthening the connective tissue between SOF and CF, thereby enhancing both the RAF and GSN efforts.

No recommendations are offered under a DOTMLPF-P analysis for facilities. *Facilities* are considered real property consisting of one or more: buildings, structures, utility systems, associated roads and other pavements, and underlying land.<sup>44</sup> USSOCOM has requested additional growth in certain TSOC HQs in order to shoulder their expanded mission as described in the GCP-SOF. Fiscal constraints, however, will make any military construction (MILCON) challenging. Gaining efficiencies through interdependence with the ASCCs may well prove critical.

*Policy*, the final area of analysis, addresses any DoD, interagency, or international directives and practices that effectively prevent the implementation of changes in the other seven DOTMLPF-P areas.<sup>45</sup> At least two Army policies must be changed in regard to the RAF management model. The first is the policy of requiring RAF units to be C-1 before assumption of the RAF mission set. This requirement means the unit is fully mission capable for decisive action, encompassing combined arms maneuver and wide-area security. The policy wastes precious readiness dollars since the Army trains a force up to the highest level only to immediately decrease that readiness by sending portions of the unit abroad to execute TSC missions. Once capabilities are deployed on RAF directed missions, then it is no longer C-1 as those capabilities remain unavailable to the unit.

In order to be prepared for any contingency, the Army must husband the units that are trained to C-1. Elements executing RAF missions should be trained specifically to their mission profile. This will create two demand signals from the CCDRs: 1) forces capable of executing named contingency plans and 2) forces capable of executing TSC activities or other missions. Another benefit to removing the requirement for RAF elements to be C-1 is that a greater number of Army personnel will be ready and available for RAF missions. More service members will undertake missions in support of a CCDR while others conduct intensive, high-end training and stand ready to respond to contingencies.

The second Army policy that must be changed to establish enduring alignment below the division level. Having division and corps staffs with continual alignment to a specific theater is valuable, but the ability for service members to execute missions in an AOR may prove decisive for the CCDRs. The Army should direct

individual service members towards regional specialization and then ensure they serve in BCTs or equivalent units that are continually aligned with that theater. Habitual alignment will provide enhanced depth of knowledge and added regional expertise. Moreover, an enduring alignment of units, resources, and personnel should build enhanced understanding and positive relationships with coalition partners.

## Summary

The RAF and GSN concepts are viable approaches for providing the GCCs and the nation with highly prepared and fully capable military forces which, importantly, can serve to enhance efficiency during a period of fiscal belt tightening. Military initiatives must achieve the maximum value while expending fewer resources. By incorporating many of the changes recommended here, the Army and USSOCOM could improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of the GSN and RAF initiatives.

## Notes

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas C. Fingar, et al. "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," Washington, D.C: National Intelligence Council, November 2008, available from [tp://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025\\_Global\\_Trends\\_Final\\_Report.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf), accessed on December 30, 2013, p. vi.

<sup>3</sup> Robin Wright, "Imagining a Remapped Middle East," *The New York Times*, September 28, 2013, available from [www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html?\\_r=1&](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html?_r=1&), accessed on October 22, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Merriam-Webster. "The Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary," available from [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/globalization), accessed on October 23, 2013.

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<sup>6</sup> CNN Wire Staff, "Mullen: Debt is Top National Security Threat," August 27, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/27/debt.security.mullen/> (accessed February 22, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> Pew Research Center, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Key Data Points from Pew Research," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, January 6, 2014, available from [www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/u-s-foreign-policy-key-data-points/](http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/u-s-foreign-policy-key-data-points/), accessed on January 11, 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Sandra I. Erwin, "Army Ponders Its Post-War Identity," *National Defense Magazine*, blog entry posted December 1, 2013, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1350> (accessed December 30, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011, available from [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf), accessed on December 30, 2013, p. 235.

<sup>10</sup> George J. Flynn, *Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Joint Staff J7, June 15, 2012), V and 1. The eleven strategic themes included; Understanding the Environment, Conventional Warfare Paradigm, Battle for the Narrative, Transitions, Adaptation, Special Operations Forces (SOF) – General Purpose Forces (GPF) Integration, Interagency Coordination, Coalition Operations, Host-Nation Partnering, State Use of Surrogates and Proxies, Super-Empowered Threats.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey, "Asia-Pacific Hands Program," memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services and Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Washington, DC, December 5, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2013, pp. 2-3.

<sup>15</sup> (Secret) William H. McRaven, "Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Campaign Plan (GCP-SOF)," Tampa, FL, USSOCOM, October 15, 2013, Executive Summary (Unclassified) pp. i-iii.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Howard Altman, "Tampa to Become Epicenter of International Special Ops Coordination," *The Tampa Tribune*, October 18, 2013, available from [www.tbo.com/list/military-news/tampa-to-become-epicenter-of-international-special-operations-coordination-20131018/](http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/tampa-to-become-epicenter-of-international-special-operations-coordination-20131018/), accessed on December 30, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Donna Miles, "USSOCOM Officials Work on Plan for Global Network," *American Forces Press Service*, June 3, 2013, available from [www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120193](http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120193), accessed on December 30, 2013.

<sup>20</sup> (FOUO) USSOCOM Global SOF Network Operational Planning Team, "Initial Capabilities Document For Theater Special Operations Command and Control," Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, September 11, 2013 Version 0.5, pp. 4-7. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unclassified.]

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<sup>22</sup> Feickert, p. 22.

<sup>23</sup> Kimberly Field, James Learmont, and Jason Charland: "Regionally Aligned Forces: Business *Not* as Usual," *Parameters* 43, no. 3, Autumn 2013, p. 58.

<sup>24</sup> (FOUO) James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, HQDA G3/5/7, "FRAGO 1 to the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) EXORD," Washington, DC: HQDA, October 17, 2013, p. O-3. [This information is drawn from a FOUO document, but the portion of the information cited is unlimited unclassified.]

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> James Learmont, HQDA G-3/5/7 Stability Support Division, "Regional Alignment of Forces 25 November 2013," briefing slides, Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, November 25, 2013, pp. 4, 6.

<sup>28</sup> Huggins, p. O-4.

<sup>29</sup> Learmont, p. 8.

<sup>30</sup> Fiona Greenyer, "Dagger Brigade," *Military Simulation and Training Magazine* (Lake Mary, FL: Halldale Media, Inc., February 2013), available from [www.halldale.com/insidesnt/culture-training/dagger-brigade](http://www.halldale.com/insidesnt/culture-training/dagger-brigade), accessed on March 10, 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Rose Thayer, "1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry gears up for regional alignments," *Fort Hood Herald*, October 9, 2013, available from [www.kdhnews.com/fort\\_hood\\_herald/across\\_the\\_fort/st-cavalry-gears-up-for-regional-alignments/article\\_0764cb74-3053-11e3-b256-0019bb30f31a.html](http://www.kdhnews.com/fort_hood_herald/across_the_fort/st-cavalry-gears-up-for-regional-alignments/article_0764cb74-3053-11e3-b256-0019bb30f31a.html), accessed on December 30, 2013.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. A-5.

<sup>35</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Army, Guard on the Brink of War: NGAUS Fires First Salvo," January 15, 2014, available from [www.breakingdefense.com/2014/01/army-guard-on-brink-of-war-ngaus-fires-first-salvo/](http://www.breakingdefense.com/2014/01/army-guard-on-brink-of-war-ngaus-fires-first-salvo/), accessed on February 22, 2014.

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<sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Force Modernization Proponent System*, Army Regulation 5-22, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 25, 2011, p. 11.

<sup>38</sup> USSOCOM, "Joint DOTMLPF Change Recommendation for Theater Special Operations Command HQs Command and Control, v 0.2," Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, October 19, 2013, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

<sup>40</sup> Feickert, p. 14-15.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, p. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Linda Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Council Special Report No. 66*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2013, p. 9.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Manual for the Operations*, p. A-5.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. A-6.